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By violating openly numerous international arms control treaties and accords, North 
Korea has demonstrated that it is a treacherous partner and a threat to all its 
interlocutors, including Russia. Although Russia has only now expressed nervousness 
about North Korea's proliferation and violation of prior accords, Moscow clearly 
continues to dream of economic and military partnership with Pyongyang and other 
proliferators.1 Indeed, Russian diplomats and officials recently publicly proclaimed that 
they still lack credible evidence that North Korea or Iraq seek nuclear weapons,2 and 
therefore viewed placing additional pressure upon these governments as unjustified. 
Similarly, Moscow has refused to forego its programs in Iran that assist Tehran's efforts 
at nuclear proliferation.3
Although Washington is now backtracking from charges that Russia has assisted North 
Korea's proliferation, its evidence apparently points in that very direction.4 Moreover, 
those claims had built upon earlier charges of Russian assistance for North Korea's 
missile and nuclear programs. Such charges never were proven definitively but 
evidently they did have some substance.5 Indeed, despite its formal collaboration in the 
war on global terrorism, Moscow continues to act like a "rogue proliferator" even as its 
officials regularly decry the rise of proliferation threats and admit clearly that such 
threats endanger Russia more than they do America.6
To understand why Russia continues acting thus, one must remember certain attributes 
of the Soviet/Russian defense industry. This sector remains unreformed in key ways, 
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not least its disproportionate access to the state and its resources. Its structures and its 
leaders will continue to seek to insulate themselves against the global economy and 
demand special privileges beyond the norm for defense industries in advanced 
economies. Moreover, this sector's spokesmen consistently repeat Stalinist mantras that 
the defense industry embodies the Russian economy's technologically most advanced 
branch or branches, that it draws upon the most qualified personnel, etc. Therefore the 
state should grant the sector privileges so that it can become again the locomotive of a 
general economic recovery.7 President Vladimir Putin and many key officials have 
stated explicitly that the defense industry is the engine of recovery and have endorsed 
increases in defense spending.8
The failure to reform this sector is reflected in trends concerning Russian economic 
growth since the crisis of 1998. As much of the recovery in industrial production has 
come from the revival of defense production, Putin's belief about that sector's 
locomotive capabilities is not unfounded, assuming that he would be content to see 
Russia stuck on a widening plateau without depth, i.e., that remains technologically 
backward. Actually, there exists much unused but quite usable production and even 
surge capability in Russia's defense industrial base, especially if it can be augmented by 
linkages to plants elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and to 
new sources of capital. Not surprisingly, two of Putin's most critical policy initiatives have 
been to reintegrate the CIS and its defense facilities around Russia while reorganizing 
his own defense industry.
By reintegrating the former Soviet defense industrial network's conventional and nuclear 
capabilities, Moscow can regain access to previously lost defense-industrial capabilities. 
Moscow pursues this reintegration because the lack of an integrated system within the 
CIS means that it cannot strike deals that would otherwise benefit those military-
industrial firms which are on the verge of bankruptcy, i.e., those that cannot compete. 
Moreover, since Moscow still cannot produce crucial weapons systems such as nuclear-
powered submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles without the participation 
of a host of contractors spread out across the CIS, it has assumed the economic burden 
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(which may be justified politically given the propinquity of the CIS) of subsidizing the 
defense purchases of the other CIS members.9
By doing so Russia also obtains other "plausibly deniable" outlets for arms sales that it 
would rather not announce. While arms sales to North Korea have continued at a low 
level and Pyongyang is interested in state-of-the-art systems, the West never has been 
able to find the "smoking gun," so to speak.10 One reason for this is now visible in the 
scandal surrounding Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's alleged authorization of the 
sale of the Kolchuga air defense system to Iraq.11 It is not for nothing that State 
Secretary Yuri Khozyairov wrote that Russia must lobby internationally to prevent the 
creation of "blacklists of arms importers that may include Russia's traditional partners - 
such as Syria, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba."12 One way to circumvent such 
blacklists is to use Moscow's connections to Kyiv and Minsk. Ukraine and Belarus are 
both striving to expand their arms sales and the Russian press has long since grasped 
that those two countries, which both sell weapons to Iraq and other undesirable buyers, 
are convenient covers for Russia, which often does not want systems traced back to it.
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Given this neo-Soviet approach, the stress on arms sales not only testifies to the failure 
of reform of the military economy, but also that these arms sales are surrogates for 
reform in order to keep the old order afloat. In defense of this neo-Soviet outlook and 
policy, Putin has observed that, 
The unique peculiarity of military-technical cooperation is that it lies where several 
important areas meet international activities in general, military-political work both inside 
the country and abroad, and trade and economy. - Judging from the volumes that 
military-technical cooperation gives to the country's budget, this is one of the most 
important areas for us. - It is common knowledge that the export of weapons and 
military hardware earns the budget considerable sums in currency. These means allow 
us to maintain cooperation between science and industry in the country, preserve the 
scientific and industrial potential and keep personnel at defense enterprises.14
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This perspective is aligned moreover to a strategic outlook that demands competition 
with Washington whatever the cost. Unless and until the idea of competition with the 
United States and great power fantasies are overcome, pressure from the military-
industrial complex to produce for the wrong world and to delay reforms will continue to 
stunt globalization's competitive thrust that could stimulate the growth of the Russian 
economy and its technological leap forward. 
Russia and North Korea
These factors help explain arms sales to North Korea and covert proliferation. Some 
Russian goals for its Korean policy are well-known, e.g., its determination to play a 
visible public role in the "peace process" and the obvious gains Russia would obtain 
from the transport and trade fees it will receive from this project.15 More broadly, 
Russian foreign policy objectives are to reestablish Russia as a world power, safeguard 
the stability and integrity of its Eurasian landmass, and participate in international trade 
and finance.16 Its Korea policy reflects these and subordinate regional objectives. 
Russia successfully rebalanced its relations with North and South Korea after the 1990s 
(when it renounced friendship with Pyongyang in favor of Seoul only to get fewer 
benefits than it expected by doing so).17 Moscow also contends that ties to North Korea 
foster the mutual confidence needed to further the inter-Korean process and the larger 
goal of bringing so-called "rogue states" (not Moscow's term) out of isolation and into 
international participation; undoubtedly this is intended to facilitate Moscow's continuing 
quest for what it calls a multipolar world not dominated by Washington.18 By gaining 
visibility in the inter-Korean relationship and international processes around Korea, 
Russia clearly enhances its status in Asia as a legitimate player that must be consulted 
on all vital issues - or at least so Moscow always professes, because all too often it still 
pursues status rather than responsibility in Europe and Asia.19
Nevertheless, other equally significant, but perhaps less visible, objectives figure 
prominently in Russia's hopes for this project. In general, Russia's Korea policy seeks to 
leverage its regional status vis-à-vis its principal challengers, America and China, and to 
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force them to reckon with Russia in Korea and Asia. Russian elites and analysts have 
observed frequently that American policies since 1991 have tended to marginalize and 
even exclude Russia from Northeast Asia.20 Thus Russian elites charged that 
Washington sought to monopolize the Korean peace process and North Korea's foreign 
relations.21
But beyond those considerations, Russian foreign policy originates in Russia's domestic 
conditions and politics and its priority objective is the pursuit of tangible material benefits 
for economic gain.22 Its Korea policy, like so many other issues on Russia's agenda, 
has been a bone of contention between "Soviet" thinkers who wish to retain a traditional 
policy and those who wish to follow a more pro-Western path. When the turn to South 
Korea failed to provide the expected gains after the fall of the Soviet Union, those who 
always supported friendly ties to former Soviet allies such as North Korea were 
emboldened to intensify their efforts to initiate a rapprochement with Pyongyang. This 
effort began in 1992-93 when Russia failed to make a breakthrough with Japan and 
turned instead to China; however, ties with North Korea began to improve only after 
1996 when Yevgeny Primakov became foreign minister.23 Since then Moscow has 
improved its connection to Pyongyang without sacrificing its relationship with Seoul. 
This trend seems to validate those elites who believe that Russian interests and the 
pursuit of peace in Korea justify both close ties and military sales to North and South 
Korea. Indeed, the justification for policies to either Korea now resides in the concrete 
material results achieved thereby.24 Programs such as the Trans-Siberian-Trans-
Korean railway (TSR-TKR) win Korean support and enable Moscow to maneuver more 
freely in East Asia.
This "two-level game" is essential to understanding Russia's overall foreign policy in 
Northeast Asia, not just in Korea. Any successful Asian policy depends upon developing 
Russia's Far East and vice versa.25 The failure to develop Russian Asia is perhaps the 
most important factor that prevents Moscow from playing a significant role in East Asia 
generally.26 Russian authorities must do more to revive the region than simply trying to 
persuade its elites and citizens that China is their friend. Moscow must obtain tangible 
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material rewards for its exertions in Asia. That means getting beyond an economy which 
depends upon limited amounts of raw material and energy exports that continue at the 
expense of future trade competitiveness and development.27
Today Moscow sees the answer to regional shortcomings as political centralization, 
taking ever greater control away from the regional governments while attempting to 
create large-scale international consortia to develop energy, electric power and power-
engineering projects.28 Such energy development projects center around Siberia and 
Sakhalin; indeed, large-scale electric power and engineering deals involving Sakhalin's 
oil have been discussed with China, Japan, South Korea and even India. While that 
project is underway, to date few other projects have materialized and the benefits of 
domestic centralization remain moot.
Therefore, in 2000-01 Putin announced a broad vision of Russia's politico-economic 
place in Asia. He particularly stressed Russia's "natural" role as a geographic bridge 
linking Asia, Eurasia and Europe. This linkage was to be accomplished by the joint 
development of major projects that extend beyond energy, electricity and power 
engineering, potentially including whatever high-tech Russia can bring to those fields, to 
include all forms of transportation (i.e., rail, sea, air and space satellites and 
communication).29
On the military side, arms sales also are expected to rescue the defense industry and to 
continue to gain leverage and friends in Korea and elsewhere. Thus the roots of 
Russia's ongoing "rogue proliferation" lie in the political economy of an unreformed 
defense sector and an incorrigibly anti-American worldview. While Russia's specific 
policies toward Iraq, Iran and North Korea partake of many diverse elements, those 
domestic inputs and strategic calculations are common to all three cases. This policy 
profile originates in Russia's incomplete transformation and tempts it consistently to 
dangerous and high-risk policies. And, lastly, this policy formation renders Russia a 
most inconstant and unstable partner of the United States. Thus, ongoing 
demilitarization of industry and of policy outlooks, the democratization of Russian 
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politics, and greater prosperity and security all are linked. In the final analysis, Russian 
security problems in East Asia and the Middle East reflect not just local security issues 
but also Russia's unconsummated democratization. 
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